

## **Cursing the Sacred: Debates on Islam and Blasphemy in Indonesia**

Syahril Siddik

Leiden University

s.siddik@hum.leidenuniv.nl

### **Abstract**

Islam and blasphemy have repeatedly emerged as the center of Indonesian public discourse and debate after the fall of Suharto. The debate becomes intense in a democratic society when people feel free to speak and deliver their opinions. When their speeches and opinions are regarded to have offences against a particular religion, the followers will protest against them. In Indonesia, these offences can be brought to court due to the presence of the blasphemy law in the Indonesian Criminal Code. Some scholars and religious leaders believe that the law have to be removed because it is not compatible with the principles of religious freedom and democracy. Others believe the law have to be defended because it is needed to regulate religious lives and maintain religious tolerance in the society. This article will investigate the diverse opinions among Muslim activists and leaders from various Muslim organizations including Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah. This article attempts to answer two questions of what are the social and cultural backgrounds of the debates on blasphemy and how religious freedom is defined through these debates in contemporary Indonesia? The data are collected from the document and the recorded video of the judicial review of the blasphemy law in Indonesian constitutional court in 2010 and the interviews concerning the decision of the judicial review. This article suggests that religious freedom is limited by the majority of opinions in favor with the blasphemy law which discriminate free speech and religious minority groups..

**Keywords:** blasphemy law, judicial review, public debates, Islam

## Introduction

The term blasphemy originated from Greece which means “speaking evil”. It can also mean “treason against God” and “all acts of verbal offences against sacred values”. Hassan defines blasphemy as “an intolerable affront to the sacred, the priestly class, the deeply held beliefs of the believers and the basic values a community shares”. He further states that “blasphemy exists to prevent challenge to the notions of the sacred in organised religion. Its existence is a litmus test of the standards a society feels it must enforce to preserve its religious beliefs and morality and to prevent mockery of its gods. In Judeo- Christian-Islamic traditions its commission is punishable by death.”<sup>1</sup>

Some sociological and anthropological works on blasphemy in Indonesia have been undertaken. Most of them conclude that modernity is the main factor which raises the discussion of blasphemy in modern society. Hassan argues that the modernization of the society plays an important role to intensify the debates on blasphemy in which it emphasizes secularization of the state and privatization of religion. This situation challenges the role of religion and forces religion to redefine its position in the society.<sup>2</sup> In addition, Daniels concludes that these debates reflect “the ongoing processes of radicalization, liberalization, and cultural and politico-jural Islamization.”<sup>3</sup>

The recent debate on blasphemy, however, arguably show a different trend. It highlights the multi-interpretation of freedom of religion in general and different understanding of blasphemy in particular which is stated in regulations. The definition of freedom of religion may develop and vary in different countries in the world. According to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, freedom has two meanings: (1) “the equality or state of not being coerced or constrained by fate, necessity or circumstances in one’s choices or actions”; and (2) “a right or liberty guaranteed by a constitution or fundamental law or granted by one in authority or assured by a covenant or popular sentiment.”<sup>4</sup> According to the Report of Freedom of Religion/Belief of the Setara Institute, freedom of religion in Indonesia is defined as “a guarantee provided by the State on the freedom of belief of individuals and the freedom of worship individually and in community.”<sup>5</sup> In addition, Dawam Rahardjo defines freedom of religion as “one

---

<sup>1</sup> Riaz Hassan, “Expressions of Religiosity and Blasphemy in Modern Societies,” *Asian Journal of Social Science* 35 (2007): 111-125.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. See also Harry G. Aveling, “Religion and Blasphemy in Modern Indonesian Literature,” in *Twentieth Century* (March 1970): 217-224.

<sup>3</sup> Timothy P. Daniels, “Liberals, Moderates and Jihadists: Protesting Danish Cartoons in Indonesia,” *Count Islam* 1 (2007): 231-146.

<sup>4</sup> Philip Babcock Gove et. al. (eds.), *Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged* (Springfield: Merriam-Webster Inc., 1993), 906.

<sup>5</sup> Ismail Hasani, ed., *Siding and Acting Intolerantly: Intolerance by Society and Restriction by the State* (Jakarta: Setara Institute Publication, 2009), 7.

of the principles of civil liberty which is protected by the State who is responsible to guard the implementation of freedom of religion.”<sup>6</sup>

This recent debate was formally held in a judicial review at the Indonesian Constitutional Court (MK-*Mahkamah Konstitusi*) in which some religious organizations, most of which are Muslim organizations ranging from radical to liberal involve to express their opinions concerning the petition of the removal of the laws against blasphemy in Indonesia.<sup>7</sup> This petition was officially delivered to the MK by some human right activists and moderate Muslims. They argue that the laws against blasphemy should be withdrawn since it is against freedom of religion and human rights which are guaranteed in the 1945 Indonesian Constitution (UUD 1945-*Undang-Undang Dasar*). It was opposed by the government and some Muslim organizations, such as the Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, not to mention the radical Muslim organizations such as the Front of Islamic Defender (FPI-*Front Pembela Islam*) and the Unity of Muslim Community (FUI-*Forum Umat Islam*).

Before deciding whether to refuse or approve the petition, the MK invited some religious organizations, governments, and experts to hear their opinions about the enforcement of the laws against blasphemy. The diverse opinions about the laws against blasphemy underline the extent to which freedom of religion should be implemented in Indonesia; whether it should be limited by regulations or not.

This article is intended to investigate the reinterpretation of religious freedom in Indonesia within the framework of the recent debate on the laws against blasphemy. In addition, it aims to explicate not only the opinions of the confronted groups which involve in the recent debates but also the reaction of the government concerning the petition of the removal of the laws. In specific, the analysis would attempt to answer the following research questions: what is the social and cultural backgrounds of the debates on the blasphemy law in contemporary Indonesia? How is freedom of religion redefined in the debates contemporary Indonesia?

The primary research data were collected from library research in which I investigated the origin of the laws against blasphemy and the document of the decision of the MK regarding the dispute of the laws against blasphemy. This document contains opinions of the confronted groups, government, and experts about the enforcement of the laws. In addition, I analyzed the documentary movie of the judicial review to capture the situation during the session at the MK. I

---

<sup>6</sup> Dawam Rahardjo, *Merayakan Kemajemukan Kebebasan dan Kebangsaan* (Jakarta: Kencana Prenada Media Group, 2010), 306.

<sup>7</sup> For practical reason, if it is stated, the plural form of the laws against blasphemy refers to the law number 1/PNPNS/1965 and the article number 156a of the Indonesian Criminal Code (KUHP-*Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana*).

would conduct a survey of people's opinions about the decision of the MK. The data analysis consists of three steps. The first step is to critically read the main data to map the opinions in the document of the MK. The second is to analyze the opinions based on categories of the parties involving in the session of the MK. The last step is to draw a conclusion of the new definition of freedom of religion based on the analysis of the opinions of the debate and responses of the society in Indonesia.

Studies of the laws against blasphemy in Indonesia have conducted by some researchers. They focus their analysis mainly on the discussion of legal system in Indonesia and compare them with those in some other countries. However, studies which emphasize opinions of the people about the implementation of laws against blasphemy, to the best of my knowledge, are rarely found.

Arief has conducted a comparative study between the laws against blasphemy in Indonesian and some other countries in the world. He describes that the specific article regarding blasphemy was not found in the KUHP. The law against blasphemy in the KUHP was derived from another regulation which was created in 1965. Therefore, the main regulation against blasphemy is in the law number 1/PNPS/1965. Likewise, he further asserts that in some other countries, such as in England, there are specific regulations against blasphemy either in their criminal codes or in other kinds of regulation. The laws against blasphemy in some countries cope with defamation of religion and beliefs, abuse of freedom of religion, insult about the sacred and places of worship, and feeling of hatred which might trigger conflict.<sup>8</sup>

Abdullah has analyzed the enforcement of the laws against blasphemy to prevent and protect religion from heresy. He concludes that the laws have a legal standing in the framework of Indonesian legal system and effectively solve disputes of the emergence of heretical groups. He argues that heresy should be prevented to keep and maintain religious harmony in society. Besides, he opines that prevention of heresy cannot only be undertaken through legal system, but also through educational and cultural programs, such as religious missionaries and interfaith dialogues.<sup>9</sup>

As mentioned above, most of the studies on the laws against blasphemy do not deal with the controversy of the laws. Therefore, this research attempts to fill the lacunae of the studies on the laws against blasphemy in Indonesia by elaborating different perceptions of the society regarding the existence of the laws.

---

<sup>8</sup> Barda Nawawi Arief, *Delik Agama dan Penghinaan Tuhan di Indonesia dan Perbandingan di Beberapa Negara* (Semarang: Badan Penerbit Universitas Diponegoro, 2008)

<sup>9</sup> Syaifullah Abdullah, "Kebijakan Hukum Pidana dan Non-Pidana dalam Menanggulangi Aliran Sesat" (Master Thesis, Diponegoro University, 2010).

This article is formulated into two sections. First, it elaborates a case study of Ahmadiyah group, which was banned by the government based on the blasphemy law. Second, it deals with conflicting interpretations and opinions about the law and its applications towards minority groups and individuals.

### Cursing the Sacred: the Case of Ahmadiyah

Ahmadiyah is a religious movement founded by Mīrzā Ghulām Ahmad<sup>10</sup> in 1889 in Qadiyan, a village of the Punjab, India.<sup>11</sup> The establishment of Ahmadiyah occurred when Ghulām Ahmad declares that he was “the promised Messiah (*al-masīh al-mau’ūd*) of the Christians, a prophet and the Mahdī for the Muslims,<sup>12</sup> and the return of Krishna.”<sup>13</sup> His announcement had infuriated religious communities in India, particularly the mainstream Muslims because the doctrines of Ahmadiyah challenge the widely beliefs of Muslim communities in India. As a result, the *’ulamā* of the mainstream Sunni Muslims in India issued their *fatwās* pronouncing that Ahmadiyah is heretic. Due to the huge disagreement of the majority Muslims in India towards Ahmadiyah’s doctrines, the small Ahmadiyah community began to pray separately in their own mosques.<sup>14</sup>

In addition, Ghulām Ahmad announces that “the Prophet Isa (Christians call as Jesus Christ) was dead and *Jihād* was only to be waged by peaceful means.”<sup>15</sup> These beliefs are in sharp contrast to the beliefs of the majority of Muslims who confirm that the Prophet Isa is still alive in the heavens and *Jihād* can be undertaken by warfare if it is needed. Blood states that Ghulām Ahmad is “anti-Christianity sentiments” through which in many occasion he challenged some Christian priests to debate about Jesus Christ.<sup>16</sup> However, Ahmadiyah adopted the way the Christian missionaries undertook their agendas to convert indigenous to

---

<sup>10</sup> Fisher states that “Mīrzā Ghulām Ahmad was born about 1835 in Qadian. He was not a success in government service or as a man of affairs, and finally devoted himself entirely to religious study and controversy”. See Humphrey J. Fisher, *Ahmadiyah: A Study in Contemporary Islām on the West African Coast* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), x.

<sup>11</sup> Syafi R. Batuah, *Ahmadiyah: Apa dan Mengapa?* (Jakarta: Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia, 1993), 3. There is some sources which state that Ahmadiyah was established in 1890. See, for example, Margaret Blood, “the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia: Its Early History and Contribution to Islam in the Archipelago” (Honours Sub-thesis, the Australian National University, 1974), 9.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. Imām Mahdī or al-Mahdī, “the rightly guided one” is widely believed by Muslims as “the name of the restorer of religion and justice who will rule before the end of the world (*qiyāma*). For more detailed information about al-Mahdī, see W. Madelung, “al-Mahdī” in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, ed. C. E. Bosworth, E. et. al., (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1986), 1230-1238.

<sup>13</sup> Fisher, *Ahmadiyah*, x.

<sup>14</sup> Blood, “the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia”, 9.

<sup>15</sup> Garstin W. A. as quoted in Blood, “the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia”, 9.

<sup>16</sup> Blood, “the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia”, 10.

their religion through distributing publications as propaganda. Friedmann asserts that Ghulām Ahmad, and his successors and other leading members of Ahmadiyah disseminated their doctrines through publications of number of books, pamphlets and articles “to explain the Ahmadi world-view and to propagate the Ahmadi articles of faith.”<sup>17</sup> It is strongly believed by many Muslims who oppose Ahmadiyah in India that Ahmadiyah was supported by the British Authorities in India to weaken Muslims role in politics and lead them to devote more their concerns to “internal religious dissension.”<sup>18</sup> This claim derived from Ghulam Ahmad’s statement that suggests “the people of each country must honestly cooperate with their respective government.”<sup>19</sup>

After the death of Ghulām Ahmad in 1908, Ahmadiyah was led by Nūr al-Dīn who died in 1914.<sup>20</sup> The majority of the members of Ahmadiyah “elected Mahmūd Ahmad, son of the founder, as his second successor”, whereas the minority refused Mahmūd Ahmad as the successor and left for Lahore.<sup>21</sup> According to Stanton, the minority split because they do not agree with Ghulām Ahmad’s political thought to be loyal to the colonial powers in India. They later founded the Lahore School of the Ahmadiyah. This group of Ahmadiyah was organized by Maulāna Muhammad ’Alī and Kwāja Kamāl al-Dīn. This new school of Ahmadiyah is later known as the Lahore Ahmadiyah.<sup>22</sup>

On the contrary, the Lahore school denies the controversial doctrine of Ahmadiyah. They view Ghulām Ahmad is a “reformer” (*mujaddid*) of Islam and a “man who is spoken to” by God, rather than a prophet.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, Ahmad and Grunebaum state that what they maintain of Ghulām Ahmad’s doctrine is only his “militantly anti-Christian sentiments.”<sup>24</sup> The Lahore Ahmadiyah since then has kept apart from the Qadian one and these two schools of Ahmadiyah continue to “maintain their hostile attitude that was apparent even before their representatives went to Indonesia.”<sup>25</sup>

According to some sources, the reliable information of the introduction of both Ahmadiyah movements to Indonesia is rarely available. Federspiel states that Ahmadiyah first arrived in Indonesia coincide with the return of some Sumatran students who studied in the Ahmadiyah schools in India in the late nineteenth

---

<sup>17</sup> Yohanan Friedmann, *Prophecy Continuous: Aspect of Ahmadi, Religious Thought, and Its Medieval Background* (London: University of California Press, 1989), 1. See also *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>18</sup> Brush as quoted in Blood, “the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia”, 11.

<sup>19</sup> Ghulām Ahmad as quoted by Blood, “the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia”, 12.

<sup>20</sup> Fisher, *Ahmadiyah*, x.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> Stanton as quoted by Blood, “the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia”, 13.

<sup>23</sup> Herman L. Beck, “the Rupture Between the Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyya” *Bijdragen tot de taal, Land- en Volkenkunde* 161, 2-3 (2005): 210-246.

<sup>24</sup> Ahmad and Grunebaum as quoted by Blood, “the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia”, 13.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

century.<sup>26</sup> However, this statement is questioned by some scholars, since the movement itself was established in the same period. Hamka asserts that the introduction of the movement to the archipelago was “through magazines and books published overseas” which was read by some Muslims in Indonesia.<sup>27</sup>

On the contrary, the later article of *Tempo* in September 21<sup>st</sup>, 1974 informs that the Qadian Ahmadiyah was introduced in Indonesia by three Sumatran students who travelled to India in 1922. They first intended to learn about Islam in Egypt which became the centre of Islamic studies at that time. Their teacher, Labai al-Yunusiyah, however, suggests them to study Islam in India because it was as good as in the Middle East.<sup>28</sup> The three student “who were all former disciples of the Sumatra Thawālib<sup>29</sup> schools” consist of Abu Bakar Ayub, Ahmad Nuruddin, and Zaini Dahlan. The three students first arrived in Lahore and learned about Islam in the Lahore Ahmadiyah schools. Afterwards, they decided to move to Qadian which becomes the origin of the Ahmadiyah movement in which they were impressed by the teaching methods of the Qadian schools. Shortly after their arrival in Qadian, they swore allegiance (*bai’ā*) to the Qadian leader, Hadhrāt Khalifa al-Masih II Mirzā Basyīr al-Dīn Mahmūd Ahmad to become the followers of the Qadian Ahmadiyah. In addition, they informed Muslims in Sumatra in their letters about their impressions<sup>30</sup> and urged some students in the Sumatra Thawālib schools to come and study in Qadian. As a result, according to Khalimi there are 23 who joined studying Islam in the Qadian Ahmadiyah schools and became its members.<sup>31</sup>

The Indonesian students who studied in the Qadian school asked the second caliphate, Mahmūd Ahmad, to visit Indonesia.<sup>32</sup> The caliphate responded

---

<sup>26</sup> H. M. Federspiel as quoted by Iskandar Zukarnain, *Gerakan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: LkiS, 2005), 169 and Blood, “the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia”, 17.

<sup>27</sup> Hamka as quoted in *ibid*.

<sup>28</sup> Zukarnain, *Gerakan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia*, 170; and Blood, “the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia”, 18.

<sup>29</sup> Sumatra Thawālib is a social organization which was founded in 1918 in Padang Panjang. In its establishment, this organization which devotes their efforts to Islamic education was directed by Haji Jalaludin Thaib. See Sudiyono, “Sumatra Thawalib” *Ensiklopedi Nasional Indonesia* 15 (Jakarta: PT. Cipta Adi Pustaka, 1991), 373-374.

<sup>30</sup> Besides impressed by the teaching methods of the Qadian school, the three students said that the educational cost in the Qadian was not expensive and there were additional financial support from the school for those who needed it. See Blood, “the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia”, 18 and Zukarnain, *Gerakan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia*, 174.

<sup>31</sup> Khalimi, *Ormas-Ormas Islam: Sejarah, Akar Teologi dan Politik* (Jakarta: Gedung Persada Press, 2010), 11.

<sup>32</sup> According to Zulkarnain, the request was delivered by Haji Mahmud as the representative of the Indonesian students to the caliphate in a meeting among the leaders of the Qadian Ahmadiyah which was held in the end of 1924 after the caliphate just returned from London. There were 19 Indonesian students who were invited in this

the invitation by sending his representative, Maulânâ Rahmat 'Alî<sup>33</sup> as a missionary (*muballigh*) to travel to Sumatra and Java. Before traveling to Sumatra, he studied Indonesian language to Indonesian students in Qadian.<sup>34</sup>

Rahmat 'Alî arrived on August 1925 in Tapaktuan, Aceh. During his stay in Aceh, he lived in Muhammad Samin's house, an Acehnese student who studied in the Qadian school. He was successful to have some new followers of the Qadian Ahmadiyah in Aceh, such as Abdul Rahman, Muhammad Syam, and Mahdi Sutan Singasoro.<sup>35</sup> Afterwards, he continued his journey and arrived in 1926 in Padang, West Sumatera. Blood states that "soon after his arrival in (West) Sumatra, a public meeting was held where he spoke with the aid of one of his Sumatran students as an interpreter."<sup>36</sup> Blood assumes that he explained the doctrines of the Qadian Ahmadiyah to Muslims in the region. Moreover, Blood asserts that "Muslims who followed traditional Islamic teaching were apparently shocked by the doctrinal deviations of Qadian belief, particularly the belief in Mîrzâ Ghulâm Ahmad as a prophet and in the death of Jesus Christ."<sup>37</sup> For example, two of the teachers in the Sumatran Thawâlib school, Muhammad Isa and Ahmad Syukur, firmly opposed the Qadian teachings.<sup>38</sup>

Although most of 'ulamâ in West Sumatera opposed the doctrines of the Qadian Ahmadiyah, there were some Muslims who were interested to join the movement.<sup>39</sup> Shortly after its missionaries' arrival, the Qadian Ahmadiyah announced to be an organization of the *Jama'ah Ahmadiyah Indonesian* (JAI) in 1926. In its early establishment, the JAI consisted of 15 members including Muhammad Taher Sutan Maradjo, Daud Gelar Bangso Diradjo, Pakih Isa, and Bagindo Syarif. This organization expanded their movement in Aceh and Palembang.<sup>40</sup> In 1931, Rahmat 'Alî went to Java to continue his agendas. He however did not visit Yogyakarta because there was other *muballigh* (s) from the Lahore Ahmadiyah.<sup>41</sup>

---

meeting including Abu Bakar Ayub, Ahmad Nuruddin, and Zaini Dahlan who later became the leaders of the Qadian Ahmadiyah in Indonesia. See Zukarnain, *Gerakan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia*, 174.

<sup>33</sup> Rahmat 'Alî was born in 1893 in Qadian. He was graduated from the Qadian school and then became an Arabic teacher and Islamic studies before promoted to the department of missionary (*Nizârat al-Da'wah wa al-Tabligh*). See *ibid.*, 175.

<sup>34</sup> Zukarnain, *Gerakan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia*, 174.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 177.

<sup>36</sup> Blood, "the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia", 20.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.* The opposition of Muslims was actually obvious since the students had informed some Muslims in their letters home regarding the teachings of the Qadian Ahmadiyah, particularly those who studied in the Sumatran Thawâlib

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.

<sup>40</sup> Zukarnain, *Gerakan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia*, 256.

<sup>41</sup> Khalimi, *Ormas-Ormas Islam*, 11-12.



Unlike the Qadian Ahmadiyah, the coming of the Lahore Ahmadiyah in Yogyakarta at the end of March 1924 prior to the Qadian (in 1925) was prominently initiated by its two missionaries, Mirza Wali Ahmad Baig and Maulânâ Ahmad. The background of their arrival in Yogyakarta was unclear. Although there were some Indonesian students who studied in Lahore, there was no information regarding the coming of the Lahore's missionaries to Java. According to Beck, the most reasonable motive of their coming is their efforts to prevent Christianization in Java.<sup>42</sup>

The history of the Lahore Ahmadiyah in Indonesia cannot be separated from the Muhammadiyah. As known, some members of the Muhammadiyah were interested in the Lahore's 'fight' against the dissemination of Christianity in Yogyakarta. Besides, there are some similarities between the Muhammadiyah and the Lahore Ahmadiyah. Beck asserts that "indeed, both organizations wanted to prove Islam to be a religion compatible with modernity, with its stress on rationality, science, and technology. To that end, both organizations devoted a great deal of attention to the central role of the principle of *ijtihad* in Muslim thinking and to the question of the extent to which Western education and Western educational methods at Muslim educational institutions. The two organizations shared the defensive understanding of *jihād* which concept was primarily seen as a spiritual effort. The two organizations also had in common their aim to purify Islam by opposing various innovations and superstitions which had crept into the religion and which were held responsible for the backwardness of the Muslim world."<sup>43</sup>

As a matter of fact, the two Lahore's *muballigh* (s) were invited and given opportunity to present their lectures in the 13<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Muhammadiyah which was held in Yogyakarta from March 28<sup>th</sup> to April 1<sup>st</sup>, 1924. In his remark, Djojosoegito, the first secretary of the organization, states that he was impressed by the "the efforts of the Ahmadiyah" who successfully spread Islam in the West. He even named the Ahmadiyah as "a sister association of the Muhammadiyah". Furthermore, he conveys that his organization intended to cooperate with the Lahore Ahmadiyah. Only did Ahmad Baig also involve in the 14<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Muhammadiyah which took place from 12-17 March, 1925. Another *muballigh* returned to Lahore "for health reason" on June 5<sup>th</sup>, 1924.<sup>44</sup>

The close relationship between the Lahore and the Muhammadiyah came to an end when Haji Rasul visited Yogyakarta. Haji Rasul, the founder of the Sumatran Thawâlib school, arrived in Yogyakarta "after the 14<sup>th</sup> Congress of the

---

<sup>42</sup> Beck, "the Rupture Between the Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyah", 220-221 and Zukarnain, *Gerakan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia*, 181.

<sup>43</sup> Beck, "the Rupture Between the Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyah", 221.

<sup>44</sup> Beck, "the Rupture Between the Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyah", 225-226 and Zukarnain, *Gerakan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia*, 181-183.

Muhammadiyah had already ended.”<sup>45</sup> He encountered Mīrẓā Walī Ahmad Baig when he was introduced by Marah Intan, “his fellow villager who was living in Yogyakarta and who was a Muhammadiyah member”, to Fachruddin and other Muhammadiyah leaders. Haji Rasul debated Ahmad Baig regarding the teachings of the Lahore Ahmadiyah. According to Hamka, “it was his father, Haji Rasul, who had opened the eyes of the Muhammadiyah leaders. This debate was the beginning of the exclusion of the two Muhammadiyah leaders who had been greatly influenced by the Ahmadiyah, namely Djojo soegito and Mohammad Husni (in 1926).”<sup>46</sup>

However, Beck explains that there are no sources which can support Hamka’s opinion. Conversely, he reveals that there is some evidence which proves that the weakness of Hamka’s opinion. For instance, “the sympathetic articles on the (Lahore) Ahmadiyah still contained in the *Almanak Moehammadiyah*, the Muhammadiyah yearbook of the year 1345/1926-1927, (Lahore) Ahmadiyah publications were still printed and published by the Muhammadiyah printing house Taman Pustaka, and the Muhammadiyah and the (Lahore) Ahmadiyah still presented a united front to the Christian missionaries and the Dutch government in Yogyakarta.”<sup>47</sup> What is certain is that Haji Rasul became the real opponent of both the Ahmadiyah movement.<sup>48</sup>

Nevertheless, Hamka’s opinion could be the starting point of the crack of the relationship between the Muhammadiyah and the Lahore Ahmadiyah. The denial of the Lahore Ahmadiyah was not visible until the Muhammadiyah held its 18<sup>th</sup> Congress in Solo in 1929.<sup>49</sup> The Majelis Tarjih of the Muhammadiyah, a body which is in charge of issuing *fatwā*, declared that the Ahmadiyah doctrinal beliefs were forbidden and the members of the Muhammadiyah who followed them infidels.<sup>50</sup>

Although the *fatwā* specifically addressed to the group of the Ahmadiyah which believe in a prophet after Muhammad, the reaction of some members of the Muhammadiyah towards the Lahore Ahmadiyah was evident. Beck states that “the archives of the Muhammadiyah’s secretariat at the house of Mohammed Husni were abruptly removed. Ahmad Baig and his students was directed objects of

<sup>45</sup> Beck, “the Rupture Between the Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyah”, 230.

<sup>46</sup> Hamka as quoted in *ibid.*, 231.

<sup>47</sup> Beck, “the Rupture Between the Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyah”, 231.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 233.

<sup>49</sup> There are some motives of the prohibition to follow the Lahore Ahmadiyah doctrines before the *fatwā* against the Ahmadiyah within the Muhammadiyah circles. See for more information Beck, “the Rupture Between the Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyah”, 233-136 and Zukarnain, *Gerakan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia*, 188-193.

<sup>50</sup> Beck, “the Rupture Between the Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyah”, 236. For the *fatwā* see Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, *Himpunan Putusan Tarjih* (Yogyakarta: Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, 1976), 280-281.

ridicule and insult. Djojosoegito, who had become the chairman of the Muhammadiyah branch at Purwokerto in Central Java, was discharged and at the same time deprived of his function in the central board. Other Muhammadiyah members sympathizing with or adhering to the teachings of the Ahmadiyah were exposed to the same kind of treatment.”<sup>51</sup>

In this situation, Djojosoegito asked Ahmad Baig for permission to establish the branch of the Lahore Ahmadiyah in Indonesia. Ahmad Baig approved Djojosoegito's request. Therefore, the branch of the Lahore Ahmadiyah was founded under the name of the Indonesian Ahmadiyah Movement (*GAI-Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia*) on December 1928.<sup>52</sup> The movement was then officially admitted by the government as an association based on “governmental decree” on April 1930. “Djojosoegito was appointed as the chairman, Muhammad Husni as its first secretary, and Erfan Dahlan as a member of its board”. Ahmad Baig became its adviser of the movement until he left Indonesia in 1936. Beck argues that there is no significant opposition towards the GAI after its declaration as an “autonomous association” in the archipelago. He assumes that the different belief in Ghulām Ahmad as *mujaddid*, rather than a prophet became the main reason Muslims tolerated the presence of the GAI. Moreover, since its establishment, the GAI only had few followers. Therefore, it was not regarded as a competitor by the Muhammadiyah.<sup>53</sup>

On the contrary to the Lahore, the Qadian Ahmadiyah was continuously attacked by *'ulamā* in Sumatra. This attack resulted in the split of the adherents of the Qadian Ahmadiyah from the majority Muslims in West Sumatra. Syeikh Abdullah Ahmad, one of the *'ulamā* in West Sumatra wrote a book which contains the “heresies” of the Ahmadiyah. In addition, Haji Rasul, published a book *al-Qaul al-Shahih* (the True Word)<sup>54</sup> to explicate the deviations of the Qadian Ahmadiyah. Rahmat 'Alī, one of the missionaries of the Qadian Ahmadiyah, responded the attack by publishing *Iqbāl al-Haqq* (the Coming of Truth) which elaborates the teachings of the Ahmadiyah.<sup>55</sup> Most of the opposition of the

---

<sup>51</sup> Beck, “the Rupture Between the Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyah”, 236-237.

<sup>52</sup> Actually the initiation of establishing the branch of the Lahore Ahmadiyah in Indonesia had been proposed by Djojosoegito in 1926. However, at that time Ahmad Baig did not agree and decided to focus on their missions to counter christianization in Java. See *ibid.*, 233.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 237-239.

<sup>54</sup> Haji Rasul's book regarding the heresies of the Ahmadiyah was also published in Yogyakarta in 1926. The aim is obviously to warn Muslims, particularly Muhammadiyah members the threat of the Ahmadiyah. See Beck, “The Rupture of the Muhammadiyah with the Ahmadiyah”, 233.

<sup>55</sup> The pressure towards the Qadian Ahmadiyah continued and spread out “from Aceh to West Sumatra”. Consequently, Rahmat 'Alī left for Batavia expecting that he would be warmly accepted in Java. See Blood, “the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia”, 23.

'*ulamā* in Sumatra towards the Ahmadiyah were in the form of written documents, such as books and pamphlets.

When arriving in Java in 1931, Rahmat 'Alī spread the Qadian doctrines in West Java and Jakarta. Likewise, the '*ulamā* in West Java also disagree with the doctrines of the Ahmadiyah. Ahmad Hasan, one of the prominent '*ulamā* of the Unity of Islam (*Persis-Persatuan Islam*) challenged Rahmat 'Alī in an open debate which main themes are concerned with the admission of Ghulām Ahmad as a prophet and the death of Jesus Christ. Rahmat 'Alī accompanied by other members of JAI such as Abu Bakar Ayub and Mohammad Sodik accepted the challenge. The debate took place in Bandung on April 1933 and was attended by thousands of people. The second debate was held in Batavia (now Jakarta) on September in the same year as the first debate. In these debates, both parties, Ahmad Hasan and the Ahmadiyah, insisted in their beliefs and the debate ended without solution. The JAI, albeit the opposition of the '*ulamā* in Java, could attract some Muslims in West Java and Jakarta to follow their organization.<sup>56</sup>

The NU, known as "a movement of traditionalist '*ulamā*", was aware of the heresies of the Ahmadiyah. However, they did not aggressively attacked the Ahmadiyah. Their effort was to prevent the expansion of the Ahmadiyah, particularly the Qadian in Java. A number of articles and books containing the heresies of the Ahmadiyah were published in Java during the years 1936 to 1937. The *Panji Masyarakat* of Batavia and the *Pedoman Masyarakat* of Medan, for instance, strongly rebutted the Ahmadiyah teachings in 1936. Abu Bakar Ayub reacted by publishing the *Bantahan Lengkap* to counter the attack in the abovementioned publications.<sup>57</sup>

Although the Ahmadiyah was opposed by most of '*ulamā* in the archipelago, the government of the Netherlands East Indies (now Indonesia) did not ban the organization.<sup>58</sup> Zulkarnain assumes that the concept of *jihād* of the Ahmadiyah was not viewed a threat by the Dutch government to their power. As mentioned above, the Ahmadiyah believes that *jihād* should not be undertaken with war, but it should be conducted with a peaceful ways, such writing a book and *da'wa*. Moreover, its second caliphate, Mahmūd Ahmad asserts that a person should be loyal to his government because it is ordered by God in the Qur'an.<sup>59</sup>

After the Independence of Indonesia in 1945 and during the Old Order period, there is scarcely source which discusses the confrontation of Muslims towards the JAI and the GAI. Did this phenomenon occur because the

---

<sup>56</sup> Zulkarnain, *Gerakan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia*, 257.

<sup>57</sup> Blood, *The Ahmadiyah in Indonesia*, 35.

<sup>58</sup> The Dutch government intensively watched and suppressed all organizations in Indonesia in order not to involve in politics. If there is an organization which involve in politics or in the struggle of Indonesian independence, it would be banned and its leaders would be arrested.

<sup>59</sup> Zulkarnain, *Gerakan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia*, 260.

Indonesian people devoted their efforts to defend the independence of Indonesia or because Muslims see syncretistic cults are more dangerous to Islam than the Ahmadiyah? As it is known that the 1965 Presidential Decree coped with the cults, rather than the Ahmadiyah.

The refusal of the JAI re-emerged in the New Order era. In its second national congress in 1980,<sup>60</sup> the MUI issued a *fatwā*<sup>61</sup> which declared that the members of the JAI are 'unbelievers' because they believe that there is a prophet after Muhammad. Mudzhar opines that this *fatwā* was specifically addressed to the JAI.<sup>62</sup> In 1984, the Director General of the Depag for Muslim Affairs and Hajj issued a circulation letter (*surat edaran*) which stipulates that the Ahmadiyah is "dangerous for the State" and desecrates religion. This letter, according to Khalimi, was based on the recommendation of the MUI in its *fatwā*.<sup>63</sup>

However, the reaction towards the *fatwā* and the decision letter of Depag was unknown until the decline of the New Order regime in 1998. The pressure against the Ahmadiyah was announced by the regent of West Lombok through a decision letter (*surat keputusan*) in 2001. He prohibited the activities of the Ahmadiyah followers in his region. A year later, the Institute of Research and Islamic Studies (LPPI-*Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam*) conducted a seminar regarding Ahmadiyah doctrines which was organized by Amin Jamaluddin in the al-Azhar mosque. The result of the seminar concludes that the Ahmadiyah has disgraced the fundamental beliefs of Islam. This seminar was also followed by a training of anti-Ahmadiyah movement conducted by the LPPI and attended by a representative of Saudi Arabia embassy.<sup>64</sup>

In addition, the ban of the Ahmadiyah activities in West Lombok inspired the regent of Kuningan to restrain the Ahmadiyah movement in Kuning, West Java which has been widely spread in the region, particularly in Manis Lor. There were many books and articles which were intensively published to attack the

---

<sup>60</sup> There is a different information about when the *fatwā* regarding the JAI was issued. Some sources state that it was issued in the second national congress of the MUI in 1980 and some asserts that it was formulated in 1984. See, for example, Beck, "the Rupture of the Muhammadiyah with the Ahmadiyya", 239.

<sup>61</sup> Actually before the MUI issued its *fatwā*, the Muslim World League announced through its religious opinion that the Ahmadiyah teachings were deviated, and called all Muslims in the world for the ban of the activities in their countries. As a result, 'Muslim' countries, such as Pakistan, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam abolished the Ahmadiyah movement. See Beck and Khalimi.

<sup>62</sup> Mohammad Atho Mudzhar, *Fatwa-fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia: Sebuah Studi tentang Pemikiran Hukum Islam di Indonesia 1975-1988/Fatwas of the Council of Indonesia Ulama: A Study of Islamic Legal Thought in Indonesia*, Bilingual Edition (Jakarta: INIS, 1993), 84/73.

<sup>63</sup> Khalimi, *Ormas-Ormas Islam*, 15-16.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

Ahmadiyah doctrines in the early twentieth first century. The Sabili, the DDII's magazine, was actively involved in elaborating the heresies of the Ahmadiyah.<sup>65</sup>

Due to heated debates regarding the Ahmadiyah, the MUI for the second time produced a *fatwā* against Ahmadiyah in its seventh National Congress on July 2005. They reveal in the *fatwā* that the 2005 *fatwā* is to reconfirm the stance of the MUI against Ahmadiyah. The *fatwā* consists of three decisions. The first point of the *fatwā* declares that the Ahmadiyah is not part of Islam and Muslims who follow Ahmadiyah as apostates. However, the second point of the *fatwā* suggests the members of Ahmadiyah to return to the teachings of Islam which are based on the Qur'an and *Sunna (al-rujū' ila al-Haqq)*. The last point of the *fatwā* urges the government to act upon the Ahmadiyah groups, to forbid the spread of the movement, and to stop all its activities in all regions in the country.<sup>66</sup>

In addition, they state in the clarification of the *fatwā* that the 2005 *fatwā* is more comprehensive, since it is formulated based on the 'library research' of the publications of both Ahmadiyah movements. Therefore, the decision is based on the investigation on the Ahmadiyah books, such as *Kitāb Tadzkira*,<sup>67</sup> *Bighām Shulh*, and *al-Nubuwwa fi al-Islām*. As for the Lahore, the MUI explains that the Lahore is considered deviated in this *fatwā* because they still follow the teachings of Ghulām Ahmad, a person who announced himself as a prophet. According to the MUI, the Lahore Ahmadiyah is not different from the Qadian, since it is stated in its book, *Bighām Shulh* that they still believe that Ghulām Ahmad is a prophet. They further explain that the prohibition of the Ahmadiyah activities in a region should be based on the coordination between the *'ulamā* and the local government which has authorities to act upon a deviated sect. The MUI would not justify the anarchism in the name of its *fatwā* towards the Ahmadiyah adherents.<sup>68</sup>

This *fatwā* has created controversies among Muslims in the country. The radical Muslim organizations like the DDII, the FUI, the FPI, the *Ittihādul Muballighin*, and the Persis reacted to the *fatwā* that the government should forbid the presence and dissemination of the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia. Some of these radical Muslim organizations marched through the main streets in Jakarta to express their ideas concerning the demand of the abolishment of the Ahmadiyah

---

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Majelis Ulama Indonesia, *Fatwa Munas VII Majelis Ulama Indonesia* (Jakarta: Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 2005), 97. For the detailed discussion of the MUI *fatwā* against Ahmadiyah, see, for instance, Lilik Rofiqoh, *The Fatwa of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia on Ahmadiyah's Doctrines: the problems of religious authority and tolerance* (Master Thesis: Leiden University, 2008).

<sup>67</sup> *Kitāb Tadzkira* is a compilation of the dreams, *kasyf*, and revelations which were delivered to Mirzā Ghulām Ahmad. This book becomes the main book for the Ahmadiyah movements.

<sup>68</sup> Majelis Ulama Indonesia, *Fatwa Munas VII Majelis Ulama Indonesia*, 136-157.

by the government.<sup>69</sup> In a plenary session of the Central Board of the NU in Bogor in 2005, the NU refused to announce that the Ahmadiyah is misleading. They further state that the Ahmadiyah is a 'new religion' which should be tolerated in Indonesia.<sup>70</sup> Din Syamsuddin, the chairman of the Muhammadiyah asserts that the Qadian Ahmadiyah has disgraced Islam because they regard Ghulām Ahmad as a prophet.<sup>71</sup> In addition, Munarman, a former commander of the FPI, specifically mentions that based on the law number 1/PNPS/1965 the government has right to outlaw the organization, such as Ahmadiyah which desecrates a religion.<sup>72</sup>

The other Muslims responded in sharp contrast with the radical Muslim organizations. The Madani Alliance which contains some prominent Muslim scholars, such as Dawam Rahardjo, Salahuddin Wahid, Adnan Buyung Nasution, and Musdah Mulia see the *fatwā* as the core of the conflict among Muslims. They state that the *fatwā* is against freedom of religion and they urge the government to remove all decisions which were based on the MUI's *fatwā*. They also argue that the *fatwā* has intensified the violence in the country towards Ahmadiyah followers. Azyumardi Azra reveals that the *fatwā* might trigger religious conflict in the society and it is not in line with the principle of religious tolerance and *da'wa* in Islam. It could also be used to justify violence towards the Ahmadiyah. Moreover, Ulil Abshar Abdalla, one of the founders of the JIL argues that the *fatwā* is not appropriate to follow, since it is not in accordance with the 'right' methods of *ijtihad*.<sup>73</sup>

The heated debate on the *fatwā* forced the MUI to organize a coordination meeting on May 2008. This meeting was attended by all the representatives of the MUI branches in provinces in the country. In the meeting, Ma'ruf Amin, the chairman of the MUI, states that this sudden meeting was held to solve the controversies of the MUI's *fatwā* against Ahmadiyah. Besides, there were some Muslim scholars and organizations that opposed the *fatwā* and asked the government to ban the MUI.<sup>74</sup>

All the MUI members in the meeting agreed that they should insist (*istiqāma*) on the *fatwā* regarding Ahmadiyah. They refused the opinions which considered the *fatwā* as a trigger of a conflict within Muslim communities. In addition, it is not true that the *fatwā* justified violence towards Ahmadiyah

<sup>69</sup> Wawan H. Purwanto, *Mengurai Benang Kusut Konflik FPI-AKKBB* (Jakarta: Cipta Mandiri Bangsa Press, 2008), 81.

<sup>70</sup> Khalimi, *Ormas-ormas Islam*, 15.

<sup>71</sup> Purwanto, *Mengurai Benang Kusut*, 86.

<sup>72</sup> A. Yogaswara, *Heboh Ahmadiyah: Mengapa Ahmadiyah tidak Langsung dibubarkan?* (Yogyakarta: Narasi, 2009), 75.

<sup>73</sup> Purwanto, *Mengurai Benang Kusut*, 87-88.

<sup>74</sup> Majelis Ulama Indonesia, *Rapat Koordinasi Pimpinan MUI se-Indonesia* (Jakarta: Sekretariat Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 2008), 5-7.

followers and even the MUI opposes the anarchism towards Ahmadiyah. The most important conclusion of the meeting is that the MUI requested the government to quickly issue the SKB to cope with the Ahmadiyah case. According to the MUI, the hesitance and delay of the government to issue the SKB might result in more violence in the society.<sup>75</sup>

The polemic of the *fatwā* concerning Ahmadiyah resulted in a “bloody tragedy” at Monas, Jakarta on June 1<sup>st</sup>, 2008. The incident happened when the National Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Faith (AKKBB-*Aliansi Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan*), which consists of mass organizations, NGOs, some artists and celebrities, and some Ahmadiyah members held a rally to commemorate the birth of *Pancasila*. This rally was aimed to support the rights of the Ahmadiyah followers to live in Indonesia. They argue that according to the UUD 1945 everyone regardless his faith and religion has right to stay in Indonesia. This rally was indirectly conducted to oppose the MUI’s *fatwā*.<sup>76</sup>

The FPI, the HTI, and the Islamic Paramilitary Troops (*Laskar Islam*) directed by Munarman at the same time held a march against the government policy to increase the oil price. The mass of these radical Muslim organizations were heading towards the State Palace when they unintentionally encountered the AKKBB at Monas. The mass of the radical organizations, who knew that the rally of the AKKBB to support the Ahmadiyah, attacked the AKKBB by burning its flags, stoning and beating its members. As a result, 29 members of the AKKBB were seriously injured in the accident. However, both parties had different opinions regarding the motives of the attack. The radical Muslims organizations claim that the attack occurred because the members of the AKKBB provoked and insulted them. On the other hand, the AKKBB argue that the attack could be anticipated if the police secured the rally to avoid the violence.<sup>77</sup>

The background of the attack is obscure due to the different information of both parties. What is clear to us is that both parties have involved in the heated debates regarding the Ahmadiyah. These debates to some degree had impacted the tragedy at Monas. In the clarification of the accident, the *Laskar Islam* states that the rally to express solidarity to the Ahmadiyah and the engagement of some Ahmadiyah members in the AKKBB were considered as provocative actions to them.<sup>78</sup>

The government eventually issued the SKB regarding the JAI eight days after the tragedy at Monas, on June 9<sup>th</sup>, 2008. Mudzhar, the director of the Division of the Religious Research and Development and Training of the Depag, explains that “based on the clarification of the SKB which was delivered by the

---

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., 67-72.

<sup>76</sup> Purwanto, *Mengurai Benang Kusut*, 88-89.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., 92.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., 94-95.



Minister of Religious Affairs, Maftuh Basyuni, the issuance of the SKB concerning the JAI does not mean the intervention of the government in religious life of the society, but it is created to maintain peace and security in the society". Mudzhar states that the SKB was created to end the controversy of the JAI and public disturbance which was caused by the case of JAI. In addition, the SKB aims to protect the JAI members from violence which may be committed by other groups who oppose them. Moreover, he asserts that the SKB has a legal standing in accordance with the article 2 of the law 1/PNPS/1965 and therefore every element of the society should obey it.<sup>79</sup>

The SKB regarding the JAI contains six decisions which can be concluded into three main points. Firstly, the government orders the JAI followers and the members of the board of the JAI to stop disseminating their teachings, especially the teaching of the admission of Ghulām Ahmad as a prophet as long as they confess that they are Muslims. The government would act upon those who violated the first point of the SKB based on the article 156a of the KUHP regarding blasphemy. Secondly, the government commands the society to keep and maintain religious harmony, security and peace in the country and forbids them to act against law towards the JAI followers and members. Those who do not obey the second point of the SKB would be punished based on the article 156 and 170 of the KUHP. Lastly, the government asks the central and local governments to provide guidance and control of the implementation of the SKB. This guidance is important to accommodate the members of the JAI who intend to return to the mainstream Islam.<sup>80</sup>

In addition, to ensure the application of the SKB, a joint circulation letter was issued by the Secretary General of the Depag, the Solicitor General Intelligent, and the Director General of the Nation and Politic Unity of the Department of Home Affairs. In this letter, they remark that the first point of the SKB was addressed to the members and the followers of the JAI who still admit that they are Muslims. In other words, those who do not confess as Muslims are allowed to spread the teachings of the JAI.<sup>81</sup>

Is the SKB an end of the dispute over the Ahmadiyah? How was the reaction of Muslim community in Indonesia regarding the issuance of the SKB? The issuance of the SKB unexpectedly exacerbates the debates on the case of Ahmadiyah. Some activists who are affiliated to human rights and women organizations object the SKB regarding the JAI. The chairperson of the National Commission on Violence against Women, for instance, asserts that the SKB is in

---

<sup>79</sup> Departemen Agama RI, *Buku Sosialisasi Surat Keputusan Bersama tentang Peringatan dan Perintah kepada Penganut, Anggota dan atau Anggota Pengurus Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) dan Warga Masyarakat* (Jakarta: Badan Litbang dan Diklat, Departemen Agama, 2008), iii-iv.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, 13-16.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 24.

contradiction with freedom of religion. She further states that it has caused pressure on children and women of the JAI. They were exiled from their own society because they believe in the JAI doctrines.<sup>82</sup>

On the contrary, Habib Rizieq Syihab, the leader of the FPI asserts that the issuance of the SKB is not enough to solve the conflict within Muslim communities concerning the Ahmadiyah. He further states that the SKB is only a warning for the JAI and it does not include the GAI which is also misleading. He proposes that the government should remove the SKB because its content is ambiguous and replace it with a presidential decree on banning the JAI and the GAI.<sup>83</sup>

Some local government in the country responded the SKB by issuing a decision letter and a regulation on the restriction of the JAI in their regions. There are currently five provincial governments and seven municipal governments which have implemented a regulation against the JAI members. They consist of West Java, Banten, East Kalimantan, South Sumatera and East Java, and Tasikmalaya, Garut, Bogor, Samarinda, West Lombok, East Lombok, and Pandeglang. These regulations in some regions were followed by violence towards the JAI members in which the majority of Muslims destroyed the JAI mosques and forced them to leave their villages.<sup>84</sup> However, some regions refuse to create a regulation in accordance with the 2008 joint decree. For example, the governor of the province of DKI Jakarta, Fauzi Bowo denied issuing a decree concerning the removal of Ahmadiyah after he learned the decrees issued by the governors of West and East Java. He added that actually the formulation of the three ministers' Joint Decree aims to protect and preserve Ahmadiyah, but it was misunderstood by many that the main objective of the decree is to ban the activities of Ahmadiyah.<sup>85</sup>

The debates on the MUI *fatwā* and the the 2008 SKB regarding the Ahmadiyah case reflect the different opinions on the implementation of religious freedom in Indonesia. Can freedom of religion be limited in Indonesia? Is it allowed for a group of Muslims to have different interpretations of the teachings of Islam from the mainstream Muslims? The 2008 SKB indicates that the government attempt to bridge those who support and oppose the ban of the Ahmadiyah. They government on the one hand decided to restrict the *da'wa* (religious missionary) of the Ahmadiyah to avoid religious conflict and on the other hand they try to protect the Ahmadiyah followers from mass violence.

---

<sup>82</sup> Yum, "Komnas Perempuan: SKB Keluar, Perempuan dan Anak-anak Menjadi Korban" *Sinergi* 6, 5 (Juli 2008): 5.

<sup>83</sup> Purwanto, *Mengurai Benang Kusut*, 237-239.

<sup>84</sup> Ismail Hasani, ed., *Siding and Acting Intolerantly: Intolerance by Society and Restriction by the State* (Jakarta: Setara Institute Publication, 2009), viii-ix.

<sup>85</sup> Indonesia's NGO Coalition for International Human Rights Advocacy, "SKB 3 Menteri untuk Lindungi Ahmadiyah." Accessed on April 22, 2011, <http://www.hrwg.org/en/news/general/1113-skb-3-menteri-untuk-lindungi-ahmadiyah>.

However, in the context of a democratic state, the 2008 SKB might be seen to be in sharp contrast with the principle of freedom of religion. The governments actually do not need to issue the SKB if they intend to protect the Ahmadiyah followers. Therefore, it may be concluded that the government has violated freedom of religion with the restriction on the Ahmadiyah activities in the country.

### Recent Debates on Blasphemy

For the first time since its creation in 1965, the laws against blasphemy in Indonesia were heatedly debated at the MK. The background of this debate was the petition of the removal of the laws against blasphemy proposed by some Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) of Human Rights and Law, and some leading Muslim Scholars on October 2009. As a result, the MK held a hearing session to listen carefully to the reasons of the petitioners who urge the MK to withdrawal the laws. In addition, the MK invited some representatives of the government, the DPR, and some religious organizations, particularly Muslim organizations who are considered to involve in the implementation of the laws in society.

The petitioners consist of the Association of Initiative Participative Society for Justice Transition (*Perkumpulan Inisiatif Masyarakat Partisipatif untuk Transisi Berkeadilan*) of the Indonesian Human Rights Monitor (Imparsial), the Institute for Study and Advocacy of Society (Elsam- *Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat*), the Indonesian Legal Aid and Human Rights Association (PBHL- *Perkumpulan Perhimpunan Bantuan Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia*), the Center for Democracy and Human Rights Studies (Demos- *Perkumpulan Pusat Studi Hak Asasi Manusia dan Demokrasi*), the Setara Society Association (Pemata- *Perkumpulan Masyarakat Setara*), and the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHL- *Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia*). Muslim scholars who involve in the petition are Musdah Mulia, Abdurrahman Wahid, Dawan Rahardjo, and Maman Imanul Haq. The first three Muslim scholars are well-known to intensively promote pluralism in the country, whereas Maman Imanul Haq is the founder of *Pondok Pesantren al-Mizan* in Majalengka, West Java. To support their opinions, the petitioners present two witnesses who became victims of the implementation of the law, and ask six scholars to explain their experiences regarding the prosecutions based on the laws against blasphemy in this hearing session.

The Imparsial is an NGO which was established by 18 activists<sup>86</sup> of human rights on June 2002. The aim of this organization is to monitor violation of

---

<sup>86</sup> The 18 activists of human rights of the Imparsial are Todung Mulya Lubis, Karlina Leksono, M. Billah, Wardah Hafidz, Hendardi, Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, Ade Rostina Sitompul, Robertus Robet, Binny Buchory, Kamala Chandrakirana, HS Dillon, Munir, Rachland Nashidik, Rusdi Marpaung, Otto Syamsuddin Ishak, Nezar Patria, Amiruddin, dan Poengky Indarti.

human rights in Indonesia.<sup>87</sup> The Elsam an organization which was founded on August 1993 to “encourage the development of a democratic political order, by means of strengthening civil society through advocacy and promotion of human rights in Indonesia.” This organization actively involves in advocating the victims of violation of human rights to get justice.<sup>88</sup> The PBHI was established on November 1995. It has branches in some provinces in Indonesia. The members of the PBHI consist of volunteers and lawyers which support the implementation of human rights in Indonesia. The PBHI was founded to watch the implementation of human rights by the government and to promote human rights in the country.<sup>89</sup> The Demos is an organization which devote its efforts to support the process of democratization in Indonesia. This organization which was established in 1997 was initiated when some researchers at the Institute for Study of Information Influx (ISAI-*Institut Studi Arus Informasi*) cooperated with Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation (SAREC). The main objective of the Demos is to promote democracy and human rights in Indonesia.<sup>90</sup> The *Setara* Society Association is an organization which is affiliated to the *Setara* Institute. The *Setara* Institute was established by some of prominent Muslim scholars, such as Abdurrahman Wahid and Azyumardi Azra, and individuals including lawyers and scholars to remove and decrease discrimination and intolerance in the name of religion, ethnicity and gender and to promote solidarity in Indonesia. They intensively conduct research regarding democracy and human rights in several regions in Indonesia and publish their findings in the form of annual reports.<sup>91</sup> Last but not least, the YLBHI is an organization which was established based on an initiative in the third congress of the Indonesian Advocate Association (*Paradin-Persatuan Advokat Indonesia*). The idea of the establishment of the YLBHI was approved by the board of the *Paradin* on October 1970. This organization helps the poor to gain their rights and to prevent violation of human rights. It members intensively promoted democracy during the New Order period.<sup>92</sup>

As for the government, the MK invited the Minister of Religious Affairs, Suryadharma Ali and the Minister of Law and Human Rights, Patrialis Akbar. The

---

<sup>87</sup> Imparsial, “Profil Imparsial,” Last modified on April 8, 2010, in <http://www.imparsial.org/profil-imparsial.html>.

<sup>88</sup> Elsam, “about elsam,” Last modified on June 10, 2011, in <http://www.elsam.or.id/aboutelsam.php>.

<sup>89</sup> PBHI, “profil pbhi,” Last modified on June 10, 2011, in <http://www.pbhi-jakarta.org/content/profil-pbhi-jakarta>.

<sup>90</sup> Demos, “profil,” Last modified on June 10, 2011, in <http://www.demosindonesia.org/profil.html>.

<sup>91</sup> The *Setara* Institute, “profil,” Last modified on June 10, 2011, in <http://www.setara-institute.org/id/content/profil>.

<sup>92</sup> The YLBHI, “Sekilas YLBHI,” Last modified on June 10, 2011, in <http://www.ylbhi.or.id/index.php?cx=1>.

DPR delivered their opinions in a written text which was read during the hearing session. In addition, the government invited 15 scholars who have qualification in law and Islam, most of whom are Muslims.

The Muslim organizations which were invited in this session are the MUI, the NU, the Muhammadiyah, the Indonesian Council of Islamic Propagation (DDII-*Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia*), the Unity of Islam (Persis-*Persatuan Islam*), the United Development Party (PPP-*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*), the Irene Center Foundation, the Central Board (DPP-*Dewan Pimpinan Pusat*) of the Unity of Missionary (Ittihadul Mubalighin), the Gathering Agency of 'Ulamâ of Islamic Boarding School of Madura (BASSRA- *Badan Silaturahmi Ulama Pesantren Madura*), the Front of Islamic Defender (FPI-*Front Pembela Islam*), the *al-Irsyad al-Islamiyah* Islamic Boarding School, the Indonesian Party of Liberation (HTI-*Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia*), the Forum of Freedom of Religious Community (FKUB-*Forum Kebebasan Umat Beragama*), the Forum of Islamic Community (FUI-*Forum Umat Islam*), and the Council of Indonesian Mosques (DMI-*Dewan Masjid Indonesia*).

The DDII was established by Muhammad Natsir, one of the prominent leaders of the Masyumi and some of his friends in 1967. This organization devoted their efforts to missionary (*da'wa*) agendas to improve Muslims' piety in Indonesia. Besides, the suppression of 'political Islam' in the New Order era caused Natsir and the members of the DDII to concentrate on *da'wa*.<sup>93</sup>

The *Persis* was established by a group of Muslims in Bandung in 1923. The establishment of this organization is to provide an association which focuses on the discussion about Islam in Indonesia. The discussion about Islam and Muslims' activities has long been undertaken by a group of Muslims before the *Persis* was established in the country. However, Muslims do not have a formal association which mainly dealt with the problems faced by Muslims. Therefore, a group of Muslims agreed to establish the *Persis* as an association for Muslims who intend to discuss about Islam. Its members, most of whom are merchants adopted the 'reformist ideas' from the Middle East.<sup>94</sup>

The PPP is a political party founded in 1971 as the fusion of Islamic parties in the New Order period. This party and the Crescent Moon and Star Party (PBB-*Partai Bulan Bintang*) have ever made an effort to include Shari'a in the UUD 45. They urged the MPR to re-insert the seven famous words of the Jakarta Charter (*Piagam Jakarta*) in 2002, but their proposal did not gain support from other Islamic parties and the MPR refuse it at the time.<sup>95</sup>

---

<sup>93</sup> Martin van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia," in *Islam in Southeast Asia* 10 (2010): 35-66.

<sup>94</sup> Howard M. Federspiel, *Islam and Ideology in the Emerging Indonesian State* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 84.

<sup>95</sup> Nadirsyah Hosen, "Religion and the Indonesia Constitution: A Recent Debate" in *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 36 (October 2005): 419-440.

The *Ittihadul Muballighin* was founded by a group of Muslims on August 1978 in Jakarta. This organization whose first chairman was K.H.A. Syaikhul aims to improve the quality of Muslims' piety through missionary (*da'wa*) and support the program of nation building of Indonesian state. It has branches in some provinces in Indonesia and some departments to succeed its agendas of *da'wa*. The members of the organization consist of some *'ulamā* of the Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia.<sup>96</sup>

The FPI was founded by Habib Rizieq Syihab on August 1998 after the fall of the New Order regime. The FPI whose leader is an Arabic descent has a main mission to prevent disobedience among Muslims and to enforce Islamic law in Indonesia. The members of the FPI frequently march down the streets to destroy some places, such as discotheques which are considered to be places for Muslims who violate Islam law.<sup>97</sup>

The *al-Irsyad al-Islamiyah* is an association of a group of Muslims which was founded by Ahmad Surkati on September 1914. This association which has strong relationship with the *Persis* is influenced by the idea of Islamic reform in the Middle East. Most of the members of the *al-Irsyad al-Islamiyah* are Arabic descents which actively promote the idea of returning to the Quran and the *Sunna* of the prophet. They involved in the conflict of Moluccas between Muslims and Christians.<sup>98</sup>

The *Hizbut Tahrir* is a 'transnational' organization whose main agenda is to establish an Islamic state in the world. This organization was established in Jerusalem 1953 and since then it has many branches in several countries in the world. This organization came into existence in Indonesia after the bombing of the World Trade Centre in New York in 2001.<sup>99</sup>

Not only the petitioners and the government do invite some scholars in the hearing session, but also the MUI and the MK ask some scholars from their side to give opinions concerning the law. The scholars invited by the MUI are Adian Husaini, the chairman of the DDII.<sup>100</sup> Amien Jamaluddin, and Abu Yamin Rahman. All parties involved in the hearing session were supported by some lawyers.

---

<sup>96</sup> Pengurus Pusat Ittihadul Muballighin, *Keputusan-keputusan Musyawarah Nasional ke-1 dan Milad ke-5 Ittihadul Muballighin* (Jakarta: Sekretariat Ittihadul Muballighin, 1983).

<sup>97</sup> The FPI, "Tentang FPI," Last modified on June 12, 2011, in <http://fpi.or.id/?p=tentangfpi&mid=1>.

<sup>98</sup> Khalimi, *Ormas-Ormas Islam: Sejarah, Akar Teologi dan Politik* (Jakarta: Gedung Persada Press, 2010), 67-71. See also Johan T. Sidel, *Riots, Pogroms, and Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 203.

<sup>99</sup> Khalimi, *Ormas-Ormas Islam*, 371-379.

<sup>100</sup> Although Adian Husaini is the chairman of the DDII, his opinions are separated from his organization. The content of their opinions may be the same, but in this case Husaini speaks as the scholars from the MUI.

In this debate, freedom of religion becomes the core of the discussion whether the law number 1/PNPS/1965 and the article 156a of the KUHP are against the constitution. It is, therefore, important to formulate the definition of freedom of religion before discussing widely divergent opinions concerning blasphemy. The definition of freedom of religion may develop and vary in different countries in the world. According to Webster's Third New International Dictionary, freedom has two meanings: (1) "the equality or state of not being coerced or constrained by fate, necessity or circumstances in one's choices or actions"; and (2) "a right or liberty guaranteed by a constitution or fundamental law or granted by one in authority or assured by a covenant or popular sentiment."<sup>101</sup> According to Hasani in the Report of Freedom of Religion/Belief of the *Setara* Institute, freedom of religion in Indonesia is defined as "a guarantee provided by the State on the freedom of belief of individuals and the freedom of worship individually and in community."<sup>102</sup> In addition, Dawam Rahardjo argues that freedom of religion is "one of the principles of civil liberty which is protected by the State which is responsible to guard the implementation of freedom of religion."<sup>103</sup>

The hearing session was marked by intimidation, specifically addressed to the members of JIL who engaged in the hearing session. Before the session was held, some Mass organizations gathered in front of the MK's building. Some of them argue that the demand of the removal of the regulations against blasphemy emerged as a new form of the PKI to support atheism. For example, the Alliance of Homeland Defense Forum (*Forpeta-Aliansi Forum Pembela Tanah Air*) states that if the law is repealed, the PKI would be free to involve in politics.<sup>104</sup> In the Sabili online, the widely-known radical Muslim Magazine, Hasyim Muzadi asserts that the petition which was sent to the MK by some people who support atheism.<sup>105</sup>

The members of some Muslim organizations including some children wearing white caps gathered surrounding the building of the MK. They brought banners and posters containing slogans and pictures of some Muslims who supported the petition, such as Ulil Abshar Abdalla, Musdah Mulia, and Dawan

---

<sup>101</sup> Philip Babcock Gove et. al. (eds.), *Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged* (Springfield: Merriam-Webster Inc., 1993), 906.

<sup>102</sup> Ismail Hasani, ed., *Siding and Acting Intolerantly: Intolerance by Society and Restriction by the State* (Jakarta: Setara Institute Publication, 2009), 7.

<sup>103</sup> Dawam Rahardjo, *Merayakan Kemajemukan Kebebasan dan Kebangsaan* (Jakarta: Kencana Prenada Media Group, 2010), 306.

<sup>104</sup> Kompas, "Massa Anti-PKI Desak MK Tolak Pencabutan UU Penodaan Agama" Last modified on March 12, 2010. <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2010/03/12/1038212/Massa.Anti-PKI.Desak.MK.Tolak.Penghapusan.UU.Penodaan.Agama>.

<sup>105</sup> Sabili, "Polemik Hasyim Muzadi-Gus Dur Atheis?", Last Modified on November 19, 2009. <http://www.sabili.co.id/indonesia-kita/polemik-hasyim-muzadi-gus-dur-atheis>

Rahardo. In the banner which contains the *Persis*' symbol, it is written "defend the law number 1/PNPS/1965. Removing it means war", while in the poster, the title was "these are the protectors of heretical groups who cannot distinguish between the diversity of and desecration of religions". A veiled-female member of Muslim organizations who stood near the entrance of the MK loudly shouted that "we all Muslims gathered here to uphold Islamic *Shari'a* and Islamic laws; whoever does not agree (with the implementation of *Shari'a* and Islamic law); (they) should go away from the land of Allah". Some members of these organizations also screamed with anger threatening to kill the petitioners when two members of the Islamic Liberal Network (JIL *Jaringan Islam Liberal*), Ulil Abshar Abadalla and Luthfi Assyaukani were entering the court.<sup>106</sup>

### Conclusion

The demand of the removal of the laws against blasphemy was sent by the AKKBB to the MK which is responsible to examine the status of a regulation within the framework of the UUD 1945. The petition of the AKKBB draws much attention of people in Indonesia, particularly Muslims. It creates tension in the society between those who agree with the petition and who do not. Afterwards, the MK held a hearing session regarding the implementation of the laws which involve all the members of the society, most of which are the members of Muslim organizations.

Freedom of religion dominates the discussion of the eligibility of the implementations of the laws against blasphemy. The AKKBB attempt to convince the MK that freedom of religion which is applied in Indonesia cannot be confined by a regulation. In other words, the government should guarantee the liberty of Indonesian people to convert to a religion and to have different interpretation of a particular teaching of a religion. In addition, it is the MUI or other religious bodies which should deal with the heretical groups and the government cannot employ the *fatwâ* as the basis of the enforcement of the laws against blasphemy. Most of Muslim organizations and the government oppose the opinions of the AKKBB and argue that freedom of religion in Indonesia should be limited to prevent religious conflict in the society. The laws against blasphemy function as a regulation to control the implementation of freedom of religion. The abolishment of the laws can create violence against people and organizations which desecrate religion. This violence can become a threat of the security and the integration of the country. The decision of the MK which refused the petition of the AKKBB redefines that freedom of religion in Indonesia is confined by the laws against blasphemy. The pressure of the majority of Muslim organizations towards the

---

<sup>106</sup> This description is based on the situation which is shown in one of the main data of this thesis, the documentary film recorded by M. Isanegri. This documentary was presented at KITLV in Leiden, the Netherlands.



government and the MK arguably influence the final decision of the MK regarding the demand of the removal of the laws against blasphemy.

As mentioned above, the recent debate on the laws against blasphemy reflects the controversy of the implementation of freedom of religion within the society. This debate also shows that the understanding of freedom of religion vary among Indonesian people which potentially trigger another debate on freedom of religion in the future.

The decision of the MK has significant implications to religious life in Indonesia, particularly within religious communities. In terms of relationship between adherents of religion, the regulation functions to maintain religious harmony and tolerance. However, in the context of relationship among followers of a religion, the majority dominate in determining which interpretation of the teachings of religion which is considered not to desecrate their religion. This situation causes discrimination towards religious minority groups, such as the Ahmadiyah.

## References

- Anwar, Syamsul. "Fatwâ, Purification, and Dynamization: A Study of Tarjih in Muhammadiyah." *Islamic Law and Society* 12, 1 (2005): 27-44.
- Arief, Barda Nawawi *Delik Agama dan Penghinaan Tuhan di Indonesia dan Perbandingan di Beberapa Negara*. Semarang: Badan Penerbit Universitas Diponegoro, 2008.
- Azra, Azyumardi. "Islamic Thought: Theory, Concepts and Doctrines in the Context of Southeast Asian Islam." in *Islam in Southeast Asia: political, social and strategic challenges for the 21st century*. eds. K.S. Nathan and Mohammad Hashim Kamali. Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 2005.
- Babcock Gove, Philip et. al. (eds.). *Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged*. Springfield: Merriam-Webster Inc., 1993.
- Beck, Herman L. "the Rupture Between the Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyah" *Bijdragen tot de taal, Land- en Volkenkunde* 161, 2-3 (2005): 210-246.
- Batuah, Syafi R. *Ahmadiyah: Apa dan Mengapa?* Jakarta: Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia, 1993.
- Bull, Ronald Lukens. "Madrassa by Any Other Name: pondok, pesantren, and Islamic schools in Indonesia and larger Southeast Asian region." *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 4, 1 (2010): 1-21.
- Cribb, Robert and Audrey Kahin. *Historical Dictionary of Indonesia*. Oxford: the Scarecrow Press, 2004.
- Cribb, Robert. "the Indonesian Massacres." In *Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts*. (eds.) Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons. New York: Routledge, 2009.

- Daniels, Timothy P. "Liberals, Moderates and Jihadists: Protesting Danish Cartoons in Indonesia." *Count Islam* 1 (2007): 231-146.
- Departemen Agama RI. *Buku Sosialisasi Surat Keputusan Bersama tentang Peringatan dan Perintah kepada Penganut, Anggota dan atau Anggota Pengurus Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) dan Warga Masyarakat*. Jakarta: Badan Litbang dan Diklat, Departemen Agama, 2008.
- Federspiel, Howard M. *Islam and Ideology in the Emerging Indonesian State*. Leiden: Brill, 2001.
- Fisher, Humphrey J. *Ahmadiyyah: A Study in Contemporary Islâm on the West African Coast*. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.
- Friedmann, Yohanan. *Prophecy Continuous: Aspect of Ahmadi, Religious Thought, and Its Medieval Background*. London: University of California Press, 1989.
- Gillespie, Piers "Current Issues in Indonesian Islam: Analysing the 2005 Council of Indonesian Ulama Fatwa no. 7 Opposing Pluralism, Liberalism and Secularism." *Journal of Islamic Studies* 18, 2 (2007): 202-240.
- Hasan, Noorhaidi. "Faith and Politics: The Rise of the Laskar Jihad in the Era of Transition in Indonesia." *Indonesia* 73 (2002): 145-169, and  
 ----- . "Between Transnational Interest and Domestic Politics: Understanding Middle Eastern *Fatwâs* on Jihad in the Moluccas." *Islamic Law and Society* 12, 1 (2005a): 73-92.  
 ----- . "September 11 and Islamic Militancy in Post-New Order Indonesia." in *Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, Social and Strategic Challenges for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. ed. K.S. Nathan and Mohammad Hashim Kamali. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005b.  
 ----- . "Reformasi, Religious Diversity, and Islamic Radicalism after Suharto." *Journal of Indonesian Sciences and Humanities* 1 (2008): 23-51.
- Hasani, Ismail. ed., *Siding and Acting Intolerantly: Intolerance by Society and Restriction by the State*. Jakarta: Setara Institute Publication, 2009.
- Hassan, Riaz. "Expressions of Religiosity and Blasphemy in Modern Societies." *Asian Journal of Social Science* 35 (2007): 111-125.
- Hendrianto. "Institutional Choice and the New Indonesian Constitutional Court." in *New Courts in Asia*. ed. Andrew Harding and Penelope Nicholson. 158-176. New York: Routledge, 2010.
- Hosen, Nadirsyah. "Revelation in a Modern Nation State: Muhammadiyah and Islamic Legal Reasoning in Indonesia." *the Australian Journal of Asian Law* 4, 3 (2002): 232-258.  
 ----- . "Fatwa and Politics in Indonesia" in *Shari'a and Politics in Modern Indonesia*. ed. Arskal Salim and Azyumardi Azra. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003.  
 ----- . "Nahdlatul Ulama and Collective Ijtihad." *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies* 6, 1 (2004): 5-26.

- \_\_\_\_\_. "Religion and the Indonesia Constitution: A Recent Debate." in *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 36 (October 2005): 419-440.
- Humphreys, Stephen R. *Islamic History: A Framework of Inquiry*. London: I.B. Tauris and Co Ltd., 1991.
- Ichwan, Mochammad Nur. "Ulama, State and Politics: Majelis Ulama Indonesia after Suharto." *Islamic Law and Society* 12, 1 (2005): 45-72.
- Kaptein, Nico J.G. and Michael Laffan. "Theme Issues: *Fatwas* in Indonesia." *Islamic Law and Society* 12, 1, (2005): 1-8.
- Khalimi. *Ormas-Ormas Islam: Sejarah, Akar Teologi dan Politik*. Jakarta: Gedung Persada Press, 2010.
- Kholiludin, Tedi. *Kuasa Negara Atas Agama: Politik Pengakuan, Diskursus Agama Resmi dan Diskriminasi Hak Sipil*. Semarang: RaSAIL Media Group, 2009.
- Kramer, Gurdun and Sabine Schmidtke. eds. *Speaking for Islam: Religious Authorities in Muslim Societies*. Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2006.
- Librayanto, Romi. *Trias Politica dalam Struktur Ketatanegaraan Indonesia*. Makassar: Pusat Kajian Politik, Demokrasi dan Perubahan Sosial/PuKAP, 2008.
- Liddle, L. William. "The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 55, 3 (August, 1996): 613-634.
- Mahkamah Konstitusi. *Profil Mahkamah Konstitusi*. Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal dan Kepaniteraan Mahkamah Konstitusi, 2008.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Profil Hakim Konstitusi* Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal and Kepaniteraan, 2010.
- Majelis Ulama Indonesian. *Mengawal Aqidah Umat: Fatwa MUI tentang Aliran-Aliran Sesat di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Sekretariat Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 1997.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Fatwa Munas VII Majelis Ulama Indonesia*. Jakarta: Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 2005.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Rapat Koordinasi Pimpinan MUI se-Indonesia*. Jakarta: Sekretariat Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 2008.
- Masud, Muhammad Khalid et al. eds. *Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and Their Fatwas*. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996.
- McLoed, Ross H. "Survey of Recent Development." In *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 44, 2 (2008): 183-208.
- Messick, Brinkley. *The Calligraphic State: Textual Domination and History in a Muslim Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
- Mudzhar, Mohammad Atho. *Fatwa-fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia: Sebuah Studi tentang Pemikiran Hukum Islam di Indonesia 1975-1988/Fatwas of the Council of Indonesia Ulama: A Study of Islamic Legal Thought in Indonesia*. Bilingual Edition. Jakarta: INIS, 1993.
- Mulder, Niels. *Mysticism and Everyday Life in Contemporary Java*. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983.
- Murthy, Ary. "Kebatinan." *Enciklopedi Nasional Indonesia* 8. Jakarta: PT. Cipta Adi Pustaka, 1990.

- Nawawi Arief, Barda. *Delik Agama dan Penghinaan Tuhan di Indonesia dan Perbandingan di Beberapa Negara*. Semarang: Badan Penerbit Universitas Diponegoro, 2008.
- Nugraha, Surya Arifin et. al. *Aliran-Aliran Sesat di Indonesia*. Yogyakarta: Banyu Media, 2007.
- Nurdjana. *Hukum dan Aliran Kepercayaan Menyimpang di Indonesia*. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2009.
- Pengurus Pusat Ittihadul Muballighin, *Keputusan-keputusan Musyawarah Nasional ke-1 dan Milad ke-5 Ittihadul Muballighin* (Jakarta: Sekretariat Ittihadul Muballighin, 1983).
- Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah. *Himpunan Putusan Tarjih*. Yogyakarta: Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, 1976.
- Purwanto, Wawan H. *Mengurai Benang Kusut Konflik FPIAKKBB*. Jakarta: Cipta Mandiri Bangsa Press, 2008.
- Rahardjo, Dawam. *Merayakan Kemajemukan Kebebasan dan Kebangsaan*. Jakarta: Kencana Prenada Media Group, 2010.
- Rahimsyah AR, MB. *Siti Jenar: Cikal Bakal Faham Kejawaen Pergumulan Tasawuf versi Jawa*. Surabaya: Pustaka Agung Harapan, 2006.
- Ricklefs, M.C. *A History of Modern Indonesia*. London: McMillan Press, 1981.
- Rumadi. *Delik Penodaan Agama dan Kehidupan Beragama dalam RUU KUHP*. Jakarta: the Wahid Institute and Yayasan Tifa, 2007.
- Santoso, Imam. *Kovenan Internasional tentang Hak-hak Sipil dan Politik*. Jakarta: Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan Hak Asasi Manusia/Departemen Kehakiman, 2003.
- Sastrosupono, M. Suprihadi. "Sinkretisme dan Orang Kristen Jawa" in *Peninjau* 8, 1 (1981): 31-35.
- Shihab, Alwi. *Antara Tasawuf Sunni dan Tasawuf Falsafi: Akar Tasawuf di Indonesia*. Depok: Pustaka IIMaN, 2009.
- Siahaan, J.E. and H.B. Yassin, "Imadjinasi di Depan Pengadilan," *Horison* 8 (1970): 228-235 and 255.
- Sidel, Johan T. *Riots, Pogroms, and Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006.
- Stange, Paul. "Javanism as Text or Praxis." *Anthropological Forum* 6, 2 (1990): 237-256.
- Suaedy, Ahmad. "Religious Freedom and Violence in Indonesia." In *Islam in Contention: Rethinking Islam and State in Indonesia*. eds. Ota Atsushi, Okamoto Masaaki, and Ahmad Suaedy. Jakarta Selatan: Wahid Institute; Kyoto: Center for Southeast Asian Studies/CSEAS; Taipei, Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies/CAPAS, 2010.
- Syaukani, Imam et al. *Kompilasi Kebijakan dan Peraturan Perundang-Undangan Kerukunan Umat Beragama*. Jakarta: Puslitbang Kehidupan Keagamaan, 2008.

- Van Bruinessen, Martin. "Saints, Politicians, and Sufi Bureacrats: Mysticism and Politics in Indonesia's New Order." *Sufism and the 'Modern' Islam*, ed. Martin van Bruinessen and Julia Day Howell. London: I.B. Tauris, 2007.
- . "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia." in *Islam in Southeast Asia* 10 (2010): 35-66.
- Van Dijk, Cees. "Religious Authority, Politics, and Fatwas in Contemporary Southeast Asia." in *Islamic law in Contemporary Indonesia*, eds. R. Michael Feener and Mark E. Cammack. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007.
- Yogaswara, A. *Heboh Ahmadiyah: Mengapa Ahmadiyah tidak Langsung dibubarkan?* Yogyakarta: Narasi, 2009.
- Yum. "Komnas Perempuan: SKB Keluar, Perempuan dan Anak-anak Menjadi Korban." *Sinergi* 6, 5 (Juli 2008): 5.
- Zaman, Muhammad Qasin. *The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodian of Change*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.
- Zukarnain, Iskandar. *Gerakan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia*. Yogyakarta: LkiS, 2005.